State trojan: whatsapp co. Should network traffic redirect to intelligence services

State tripojan: WhatsApp & amp; Co. Should network traffic redirect to intelligence services

The digital industry runs storm against the draft speaker from the federal ministry of the interior for a law "for the condition of the preamble protection right". According to the initiative of resortkef horst seehofer (CSU), the federal office for field protection (BFV), the federal court of first instance (BND), the militarical shielding service (MAD) and the 16 landesamter for festival protection with state trojans chats on fessenger such as whatsapp, signal or threema and internet -telefonates and video calls abhren thirst. The fact that the affected service providers should act as auxiliary pione in the rough style, leads to displeasure.

The association of the internet economy ECO criticizes above all that providers "introduction of technical means for carrying out a maaking" to the so-called source TKU "by supporting the redirection of telecommunications by the authorized body" muster. This clause, which read the use of proxy servers for the discharge of traffic, throw "a variety of legal and procedural questions".

Active support

With this authority, it is a novelty, since service providers "now actively support the intelligence services to infiltrate the end devices of customers", the ECO explains. In addition, the ministry of the interior does not point out that with the entry into force of the new telecommunications act (TKG) the number of funds obligated to provide information "immensely rises". In addition to classic telcos, it also fell as well as providers for e-mail, messaging, and voip services.

The reason for considerable worries also gives the association the intended authority, after the "active interventions in the integrity" the telecommunications networks were allowed. Needlessly here are more reliable rules in order to minimize the resulting risks requires the association. Thus, about measures had to be excluded, "where a danger of the affected infrastructure can not be excluded".

After segregation of the ECO, the legislator also wants to allow intelligence services to even urge the data streams concerned. Regardless of the question of whether such procedures could be covered by the telecommunications secrecy enshrined in article 10 of the basic law, such measures are according to the association "in any case suitable to massively undermine the confidence in communication inelectly all retrieved information". The passage should therefore be painted by coarse part.

Massive correction needs

Even with the control possibilities of intelligence activities, the association sees massive correction needs. The ministry also has the costs on the economy for concealed procedures in IT systems with 20.000 euro per year significantly too low. As far as data were requested that have not yet been captured in the existing systems to be captured, as well as potentially new infrastructure must be installed, the fries increased "quickly in multiple million".

Similar criticism aubert the bitkom. The project was therefore undertaken to telecommunications providers, "actively helping the security authorities to help shadow software on their networks in the final devices of the target persons". This approach "however, the enormous risks for the entire network integration of the provider and the associated trust losses".

The bitkom also advocates the overall impact of currently discussed law initiatives "especially with regard to the amendments of telecommunications and IT security law" do not lose sight of the eyes. In view of the relevant legal uncertainty for the providers "it is urgently offered to address liability and claims for damages, as the resulting risks are an unprecedented risk of charges by the current bill".

Previously, a media court had appealed to seehofer and the federal government, with the project not removing informant protection. Indoor and legal politicians from the CDU / CSU parliamentary group, however, is not far enough. They want to prevail against the resistance of the SPD that the intelligence services not only monitor ongoing telecommunications by source TKU, but IT systems and their users also ask for more securely online searches.